The relationship between corporate independence and firm performance: the case of public listed firms in Malaysia. by Wagner, Karl & Fard, Pooyan Yousefi
The Relationship between Corporate Independence and Firm Performance: The Case of Public 
Listed Firms in Malaysia 
185 
 
The Relationship between Corporate 
Independence and Firm 
Performance: The Case of Public 
Listed Firms in Malaysia 
 
by: 
Karl Wagner 
University of Applied Sciences, Rosenheim Germany 
Pooyan Yousefi Fard 
University Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Relationship between Corporate Independence and Firm Performance: The Case of Public 
Listed Firms in Malaysia 
186 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between board independence and firm 
performance in Malaysia. The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
states that at least one third of board members must be independent. Hence, 
this evolves the question of whether increased board independence can 
contribute to better performance. This study proves that those corporations 
which have more independent board members(more than one third of board 
members which is obligatory)have better firm performance. We included 
randomly selected 120 public listed companies in Malaysia’ Stock Exchange 
Board (KLSE), where the performance is measured for the financial year 
2006. While this work has been successfully established this positive 
relationship, it acknowledges the fact, that there are shortcomings. They 
include only three independent variables, such as independent board members, 
board size and firm size. Furthermore, the study is only done for one year, and 
it only involves 120 companies. Although the number of companies is enough 
to represent corporate Malaysia, a larger sample size will provide better 
justification for the empirical findings. Considered all these facts, we can 
provide strong evidence and conclude that a higher number of independent 
board members may significantly lead to higher business performance. 
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Introduction 
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance stipulates that at least one third 
of any Board of Directors must consist of independent directors. The code was 
adopted in response to the East Asian financial crisis in 1997, calling for, 
among others, greater transparency and good governance. 
 
The positive effect of this former crisis in improving corporate governance 
practices was summarised by the then Second Finance Minister, Mustapa 
Mohamad. In his own words: 
The East Asian crisis poses a multitude of challenges. The biggest challenge 
ahead for the country is to resume its drive towards development, to resume 
growth. In restoring growth, an industrialising nation such as Malaysia, must 
have a clear process in place. This process includes sound regulation of 
markets, including good corporate governance practices which will aid to 
bring about greater depth and resilience to the Malaysian economy. What I 
would classify as a positive feature of the crisis, is the sense of urgency with 
which issues of corporate governance are being addressed. Throughout the 
world, corporate governance reforms have arisen from local crises. East Asia 
is not different. (Treasury, 199). 
 
Mustapa was also quick not to conclude that better corporate governance 
practices as the silver bullet, while at the same acknowledged its importance. 
 
This research however, focuses only one aspect of the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance, the independence of the board of directors and its 
relation to the firm performance. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Does Firm Composition Affect the Firm Performance? 
This chapter discusses the literature on how board composition affects firm 
performance or vice versa. Studies of the effect of board composition on firm 
performance generally adopt one of two approaches. The first approach 
involves studying how board composition affects the board’s behaviour on 
discrete tasks, such as replacing the CEO, or acquiring another firm and the 
like. Conversely, the second approach directly examines the relationship 
between board composition and firm performance in which in our study has 
grasped its major concern.  Overall correlation between board composition 
and firm performance involves studying whether board composition affects 
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overall firm performance. This approach allows us to examine the “bottom 
line number” of firm performance, but involves much less traceable data. Firm 
performance must be measured over a long periods which means that 
performance measures are not valid and perhaps misspecified.   
 
Clearly, prior research does not support a clear correlation between board 
independence and firm performance. For example, early work by Vance 
(1964) reports a positive correlation between the proportion of inside directors 
and a number of performance measures. Baysinger and Butler (1985), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), and MacAvoy (1983) and coauthors all report 
no significant same year correlation between board composition and various 
measures of corporate performance. A large-sample study by Ferris and his 
coauthors finds no significant correlation between proportion of outside 
directors in 1995 and ratio of market value to book value in 1997. An early 
expectation to these non-results come from Baysinger and Butler (1985), who 
report that the proportion of the independent directors in 1970 correlates with 
1980 industry-adjusted return on equity. However, their ten-year lag period is 
very long for any effects of board composition on performance to persist. 
Studies in Australia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom find no correlation 
between board composition and firm performance either.  
On the contrary, a few studies offer hints that firms with a high percentage of 
independent directors may perform worse. Yermack (1996) reports a 
significant negative correlation between the proportion of independent 
directors and contemporaneous Tobin’s q (ratio of the market value of a firm’s 
asset to the book value of its assets), but no significant correlation for several 
other performance variables (sales/assets; operating income/assets; operating 
income/sales). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) report a negative correlation 
between the proportion of outside directors and Tobin’s q. Klein reports a 
significant negative correlation between a measure of change in market value 
of equity and proportion of independent directors, but insignificant results for 
return on assets and stock market returns. Fosberg (1988) reports that 
majority-outside boards have a significantly lower sales/assets ratio, but finds 
insignificant (although generally negative) results for several other 
performance measures. 
 
Even studies like Rosenstein and Wyatt find that stock prices increase by 
about 0.2% on average when a company appoints an additional outside 
director. This increment, while statistically significant, is economically small 
and could reflect signaling effects. Appointing an additional outside director 
could signal that a company plans to address its business problems, even if 
board composition doesn’t affect the company’s ability to address these 
problems. Moreover, Rosenstein and Wyatt find a stronger price reaction for 
outside directors who work for financial institutions than for directors whose 
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principal job is with another unrelated non-financial corporation. Yet, outside 
directors who work for financial institutions are usually treated as affiliated 
outside directors rather than independent directors, because their own firm 
may be interested in business dealings with the firm on whose board they sit. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt find that stock prices neither increase nor decrease on 
average when an insider is added to the board. 
 
Composition of board committees  
Klein (YEAR) finds that inside director representation on a board’s investment 
committee correlates with improved firm performance. She finds little 
evidence that the “monitoring” committees that are usually dominated by 
independent directors - the audit, compensation, and monitoring committees- 
may affect performance, regardless of how they are staffed. 
 
Does Firm Performance Affect Board Composition? 
An important issue in studying the correlation between board composition and 
firm performance is the direction of causation. Board composition could affect 
firm performance, but firm performance can also cause the firm to change its 
board composition. Prior researchers have found limited evidence of an 
endogenous relationship between firm performance and board composition in 
which performance affects board composition.  
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), and Weisbach (1988), report that the 
proportion of independent directors on large firm boards increase when a 
company has performed poorly. This effect is statistically significant, but 
numerically small. Weisbach concludes from this evidence that since the 
change in board composition following poor performance is relatively small, 
and board composition changes very slowly over time, it is unlikely that the 
potential endogeneity of the board composition is a serious problem.  
 
In contrast to Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Klein (1998) finds no evidence 
that performance affects board composition. In her sample, firms in the bottom 
quintile for 1991 stock price returns are no more likely to add independent 
directors in 1992 and 1993 than the firms in the top quintile. Denis ad Sarin 
(1989) report that firms that substantially increase their proportion of 
independent directors had above-average stock price returns in the previous 
year. They also report that average board composition for a group of  firm 
changes slowly over time and that board composition tends to regress to the 
mean, with firms that have a high (low) proportion of independent directors 
reducing (increasing) this percentage over time.  
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Why Board Composition has become a Hot Issue in Malaysia? 
The year 1997 witnessed the worst financial crisis to hit the developing world 
since the 1982 Latin American debt crisis and prior to the still prevailing 
global crisis 2008/2009. What started out as a localised currency crisis in 
Thailand, rapidly turned into a financial and economic crisis in nearly all East 
Asian countries. Some parallels compared with the current crisis can be 
allocated. From being one of the best performing regions in the world, even up 
to as late as May 1997, the region became one that required the largest 
financial rescue in history at this time. The speed at which the crisis spread 
and the severity of the contagion effects were never experienced before.  
As we are grappling with the most severe crisis ever these days, there is still 
no international consensus on the causes surrounding this previous financial 
crisis. The economies of the East Asian countries contracted in 1998 as a 
result of the crisis. Adverse developments unfurled, and the economic outlook 
was changed from positive to very negative. The expectations of both foreign 
and domestic investors changed abruptly. The region was perceived as one 
beset with high risks prompting a massive reversal of capital flows from the 
region. This resulted in the financial panic, irrational investor’s behaviour, and 
overreaction to the changed economic and financial situation. Malaysia was 
not spared from the crisis: The Malaysian Ringgit experienced waves of 
speculative pressure. It depreciated 40% against the US Dollar by the end of 
August 1998 from its level in June 1997. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) Composite Index fell by 79% from a high of 1,271 points in February 
1997 to an unprecedented low of 262 points in September 1998. The vicious 
cycle of massive withdrawal of funds from the domestic financial markets to 
safer offshore havens started. The effects then spread through the banking and 
corporate sector. High interest rates and marked drop in domestic demand 
crippled the financial performance of the corporate sector. Companies 
borrowed heavily from banks to finance their rapid expansion during the good 
times, sometimes expansion to areas of non-core business. This made them 
very vulnerable to interest rates fluctuations. With the high interest rates and 
the economic contraction the debt servicing capacity of these companies were 
greatly affected. This in turn created large number of non-performing loans for 
the banking sector. As a result, banks became overly cautious in extending 
new loans even to viable businesses. 
 
The financial crisis brought the weak corporate governance practices to the 
foreground: the weak financial structure of many companies; over-leveraging 
by companies; lack of transparency, disclosure and accountability; existence 
of a complex system of family control companies; little or no effective laws to 
ensure that controlling shareholders and management treat small investors 
fairly and equitably; assets shifting; conglomerate structures that were 
perceived to be given preferential treatment; allegations of cronyism – “the 
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aggrandizement of a politically connected few”; lack of transparency and 
ambiguity in the regulatory processes; and weaknesses in the credit evaluation 
processes by the banks. Weak corporate governance practices by these 
companies, though, did not cause the financial crisis, but certainly contributed 
to the economic crisis. Against this backdrop, the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (the Code) was introduced in 2000, after detailed study 
and recommendations made by the high level Finance Committee which was 
formed in 1998 with the objective of improving the corporate governance 
practices by the corporate sector. 
 
2.1 Measurement Control Variables 
Our regression results control for a number of factors that could affect firm 
performance, board composition, or both. The control variables that we use 
are: 
• Board size =measured as the total number of directors on the board. 
• Firm size = Total Assets 
 
Dimensions & Definitions 
 
Dimensions Definition 
Board Size Total number of directors on the board. 
 
Firm Size Proxied by log of Total Sales  [  log(sales)  ] 
Independence Fraction of non-executive members in the 
company board 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
We derived our theoretical framework based on accounting measures we draw 
Bhagat and Black (2002), which will be the basis of our research. Our 
theoretical framework includes three independent variables, which are 
Independence, Board Size, Firm Size. We have one dependent variable which 
is Firm Performance. We have developed a model in Figure 2.1 to 
conceptualize the conceptual framework of the study. 
 
 
The Relationship between Corporate Independence and Firm Performance: The Case of Public 
Listed Firms in Malaysia 
192 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Research Design 
We follow the common practice of dividing directors into independent 
directors and non-independent directors. For independent directors, we further 
divide them into independent executive directors and independent non-
executive directors.  In out paper, we only consider of independent non-
executive director as independent director (INDEP). We indicate the 
proposition of independent directors and independent executive directors as 
findep and findepexe.   
INDEP = Findep – FindExe 
 
The construct of our sample is sourced from downloading the audited annual 
report disclosed at the Malaysian stock exchange Bursa Malaysia’s website 
(announcements.bursamalaysia.com). The data gathered for this research for 
the year 2006. In total, the initial list downloaded from Bursa Malaysia 
consists of 640 firms. The criteria for selection of samples are as followed: 
 All financial institutions are excluded from the list.   
 The analysis is through a balanced panel data method, any firms that 
do not have a 2006 data are eliminated from the list.   
 All firms are assumed to be having the same financial year-end. 
  
Data Gathering Methods 
The data were gathered through the Malaysian stock exchange, Bursa 
Malaysia public website (www.announcements.bursamalaysia.com) and a 
commercial database “perfect analysis”. In total, there are 640 firms listed on 
the exchange for the year 2006.  We have randomly selected 120 firms as the 
sampling size for our study. All the annual reports of the selected public 
companies listed on the stock exchange (Mainboard, Secondboard and 
Mesdaq) from year 2006 are downloaded from the website.  
 
The Population 
Our research attempts to infer its result on all publicly listed company in 
Malaysia. The population of the result is the whole of the firms listed in the 
bursa Malaysia stock exchange inclusive of the Mainboard, Secondboard and 
Mesdaq market. All firms that fulfil the requirement of audited financial 
statements are included in the population. Financial institutions such as 
merchant banks, commercial banks, finance companies, insurance firms, 
brokerage houses and discount houses are excluded from the study. This is 
because financial institutions are subjected to different sets of rules and 
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regulation (Malaysia banking law) and have different motivation in their risk 
management practices (e.g. Bassel II). 
 
3.1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
As it is hypothesized that Board Independence and Firm Performance is 
determined simultaneously, a two-stage regression analysis is deployed. We 
adopted the simultaneous equation method:  Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
to address the Endogeneity issue.  
 
Endogeneity  in board composition (Weisbach & Hermalin , 2000) 
 
Board composition could affect future firm performance, but firm’s past 
performance could affect the firm’s future board composition.  If board 
composition is endogeneity, OLS coefficient estimation can be biased.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
Simultaneous two-stage regression analysis was conducted to test the 
hypotheses proposed in the methods section above. The results of the analyses 
are presented in Table 4.6. The analysis showed that the extent to which the 
following independent variables predicted overall firm performance: 
Independent 53%, and Firm Size 1%. According to the findings of the study, 
Board Size did NOT have significant relationships with overall firm 
performance . 
 
Hypothesis 1 
H1o 
There is no significant simultaneous relationship between Board 
Independence and Firm Performance. 
H1A 
There is positive simultaneous relationship between Board 
Independence and Firm Performance. 
 
 
              Null hypothesis H1o is rejected. The results of first stage regression 
analysis revealed that board independent dimension is not significantly 
associated with firms’ overall performance.  However, the 2nd stage regression 
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revealed that board independent dimension is significantly associated with 
firms’ overall performance.   
 
Hypothesis 2 
H2o 
There is no significant relationship between the Board Member Size 
and Firm Performance. 
H2A 
There is significant relationship between the Board Member Size 
and Firm Performance. 
 
Hypothesis H2A is rejected! The results of first stage regression analysis 
revealed that board member size dimension is not significantly associated with 
firms’ overall performance. 
  
Hypothesis 3 
H3o There is no significant relationship between the Firm Size and Firm Performance. 
H3A 
There is significant relationship between the Firm Size and Firm 
Performance. 
 
 Null hypothesis H3o is rejected. The results of first stage regression 
analysis revealed that board independent dimension is significantly associated 
with firms’ overall performance. It accounted for 1% of the variance in 
students’ overall satisfaction. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Through this research studies, we examine a reasonably strong correlation link 
in between the firm performance and board independence whereby it supports 
a kind of conventional wisdom favouring a board with high degree of 
independence.  
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Quoted from a Malaysian context, The Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance (1999) describes corporate governance as “the process and 
structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company 
towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the 
ultimate objective of realizing long term shareholders value, taking into 
account the interests of other stakeholders”.  
 
Daily and Dalton (2003) state that “board independence is like a lighthouse on 
a dark and stormy night. It serves as the beacon of hope for corporate 
governance reform activists who embrace the perspective that more 
independent boards will results in greater oversight of corporate management 
and that this, in turn, will lead to improved firm performance”  
 
To ensure sound corporate governance, Clarke (1998) referred emphatically to 
the Cadbury Report’s recommendations concerning non-executives directors. 
They should make independent judgments on issues of strategy, performances, 
resources, key appointments and standards of conduct. Indeed, the existence of 
relatively independent non-executive directors in the board will strengthen and 
influence decisions. In addition, it is still to be found out in how far well 
aligned and successful monitoring mechanisms as another potential internal 
catalyst factor will improve the company’s performance. 
However, there are still some resistance to welcome the shift from non-
independent to independent members who potentially could lead to achieving 
better performance in the long run.  
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Due to time and budget constraint, the sample used in this research study is 
only limited to 120 firms within a study life span of one year (2006). 
 
We recommend on a further study to rectify some of the weaknesses in prior 
works including ours by:  
 
1. Using a large sample to improve signal-to-noise ratio.  
This can be performed by examining the performance of all listed companies 
in Malaysia. 
 
2. Measuring performance over a long period of time, rather than just 
at a single year as seen in this study.  
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In order to get a more representative result, it is suggested that future studies 
on this topic to account for the performance of firms for a period of at least 
five years.  
 
3. Using a number of different performance measures. 
Based on our research, only the return and asset size is measured. Other 
measurements that are useful in future studies include Tobin’s q40, ratio of 
sales to assets and market adjusted stock price return. 
 
4. Using a number of different performance measures. 
Another shortcoming of this research that should be rectified is by employing 
a larger set of control variables, including CEO stock ownership, outside block 
holder ownership, independent director ownership, board size and firm size. 
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